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Abstract
What is the distinctively philosophical problem of perception? Here it is argued that it is the
conflict between the nature of perceptual experience as it intuitively seems to us, and certain
possibilities which are implicit in the very idea of experience: possibilities of illusion and hallu-
cination. Perceptual experience seems to us to be a relation to its objects, a kind of ‘openness
to the world’ which involves direct awareness of existing objects and their properties. But if one
can have an experience of the same kind without the object being there — a hallucination of
an object — then it seems that perceptual experience cannot essentially be such a relation.
This is the fundamentally philosophical problem of perception; the various philosophical
theories of perception in the 20th and 21st centuries can be seen as responses to it.
1. Introduction
It will be obvious to anyone with a slight knowledge of twentieth-century
analytic philosophy that one of the central themes of this kind of philosophy
is the nature of perception: the awareness of the world through the five
senses of sight, touch, smell, taste, and hearing. Yet it can seem puzzling,
from our twenty-first-century perspective, why there is a distinctively philo-
sophical problem of perception at all. For when philosophers ask ‘what is
the nature of perception?’, the question can be confused with other, purely
empirical, questions. For example: how do our sense-organs actually work?
What are the mechanisms of smell and taste? How do vision and touch ac-
tually provide us with information about the world around us? There is
much general agreement, in its broad outlines, about how to answer such
questions empirically; but it is not clear what role, if any, philosophy has to
play in answering these empirical questions. So if these were the only ques-
tions about the nature of perception, then it would not be clear exactly
what the philosophy of perception is supposed to be about.
Some philosophers (e.g. Brewer, 2000) have argued that there is a distinc-
tively philosophical question here, but it is epistemological, viz. how does
perception provide reason for our beliefs about the empirical world? This,
it seems, is a question which remains to be answered even after the empiri-
cal world is done. This is because the question about reasons is normative
rather than scientific or descriptive. Even once the psychological theory of
vision, for example, has done its job in describing fully the mechanisms of
vision, the normative question still can be asked: what makes this process
result in something which gives a reason, something which justifies a be-
lief? Suppose I see a bottle before me, and come to believe on the basis of
this that there is a bottle before me. My reason for believing that this is a
bottle is that I can see it. But what makes seeing the bottle a reason for this
belief? It can be argued that the need to give a satisfactory answer to this
question constrains our choice of theory of perception. Some say that we
need to see perception as involving a ‘direct’ or unmediated awareness of
the world, for example, if perception is to play the role of giving us reasons.
Others say that we should think of our knowledge of the empirical world as
based on an inference to the best explanation of the data given to us by
perception, which data may fall short of direct awareness of the world
itself.
Of course, some will dispute the distinction made here between descriptive
and normative questions, and insist that questions about reasons or war-
rant can be answered in purely descriptive, causal terms. But even if this
were so, this epistemological dispute is nonetheless a distinct one from the
empirical question of what the causal mechanisms of vision and touch etc.
are. It is a dispute about what counts as a reason. The epistemological
problem of perception just described proceeds on the assumption that the
form of warrant or justification at issue here is internalist justification: the
kind which subjects themselves can provide for their own beliefs (see Bon-
Jour, 1985). But it would be possible to conceive of the warrant for empiri-
cal beliefs in different terms – for example, in the way a reliabilist would. A
reliabilist treats knowledge as true belief acquired by a reliable method
(Armstrong, 1970). On this conception, perception warrants empirical be-
lief by being the paradigm of a reliable method. An account of the causal
mechanisms of the senses work would then, of course, be part of the ac-
count of perceptual warrant. But nonetheless these would be put into the
epistemological framework of a reliabilist account of warrant.
Are these epistemological problems of perception the only real philosophi-
cal problems here? One way to approach this question is to ask: suppose
one had settled to one’s satisfaction the answer to the above epistemologi-
cal question. Would any distinctively philosophical problem of perception
then remain? If the epistemological problem were the only philosophical
problem, then the answer would have to be no. The same would apply if we
rejected the epistemological question as based on misconceived ideas about
warrant and knowledge. For if we have answered, or rejected as miscon-
ceived, the question ‘how does perception give reasons for belief?’ then all
that would remain is the empirical study of the senses. There would be no
more for philosophy to do.
But if this were right, then it would be impossible to make sense of much of
the history of the philosophy of perception in the twentieth-century. The
philosophy of perception appears to ask questions which are, on the face of
it, not directly related to the epistemological question about perception
just discussed. Philosophers of perception ask questions such as: what is
the relation between perception and belief? How should we construe the
relationship between appearance and reality? Does the idea of sensation
have any place in understanding perception? How does perceiving some-
thing differ from thinking about it? Does perception involve the awareness
of non-physical objects? What is the role of concepts and conceptualising
in perception? What kind of introspective knowledge do we have of our
own perceptions? And so on. While it would be just about possible to treat
all these questions purely in terms of how they contribute to the epistemo-
logical question, this will tend to distort the underlying issues at which
some or all of these questions are pointing. Or so it will be argued here.
This paper will therefore present and discuss the problems of perception
which are distinct both from the problem of how perception justifies em-
238SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA T. Crane, What is the Problem of Per-40 (2/2005) pp. (237–264) ception?
pirical belief and from the empirical studies of vision and the other senses.
Of course, it is somewhat artificial to distinguish problems in this way; it
will turn out that epistemological and empirical considerations do overlap
with the answers to the questions which will be discussed here. The point is
not that the study of perception is not an empirical or an epistemological
matter; it is rather that the problems discussed by epistemology and em-
pirical psychology do not constitute the whole of the philosophy of percep-
tion.
2. Openness to the World
The problem of perception which, it will be argued here, has been central
to analytic philosophy, is a result of attempting to reconcile some appar-
ently obvious truths about perception with the apparent possibility of a cer-
tain kind of perceptual error. We can express the problem in an intuitive
way as follows. Perceptual experience seems to be what we might call an
‘openness to the world’: an immediate awareness of mind-independent ob-
jects. Indeed, it is arguable that the nature of a perceptual experience is
partly determined or constituted by the nature of its objects. But it also
seems possible for someone to have an experience (which we shall call a
‘hallucination’) which is subjectively indistinguishable from a genuine per-
ception of a mind-independent object, but where there is no mind-inde-
pendent object being perceived. And if conscious states of mind which are
subjectively indistinguishable are states of the same kind, then the problem
emerges: how can it be that the nature of a perceptual experience is partly
determined or constituted by the nature of its mind-independent objects if
it is possible for such an experience to occur in the absence of such ob-
jects? Either perceptual experiences depend on mind-independent objects,
or they do not. If they do, then what should we say about hallucinatory ex-
perience? But if they do not, then it seems that much of what we believe
about perception is false.
Here then are the four assumptions which form the essence of the problem
as outlined above:
(1) Mind-independence: When a subject has a perceptual experience as of
an object or objects, the only objects perceived – if any objects are per-
ceived at all – are ordinary, mind-independent objects. For example,
when I have a perceptual experience of the snow-covered churchyard
outside my window, the only objects perceived are the churchyard, the
window and so on: ordinary objects whose existence is not dependent
on my state of mind.
(2) Object-dependence: When a subject has a perceptual experience of an
object, the nature of the experience is partly determined by the nature
of the actual object currently being perceived. For example, when I
have a visual experience of the actual white snow in the churchyard,
then the nature of this experience is partly determined by the way the
object, the snow, actually is now; by how things are with the snow dur-
ing the experience. If the snow were grey and melting, then ceteris pari-
bus my experience would be different.
(3) The possibility of hallucination: It is metaphysically possible for a sub-
ject to have an experience which is subjectively indistinguishable from
a veridical perception of an object of a certain kind, but where there is
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nothing of that kind being perceived. For example, I may have an ex-
perience which is subjectively indistinguishable from a veridical per-
ception of a snow-covered churchyard but where there is in fact no
churchyard which I am perceiving at all.
(4) The identity of subjective indistinguishables: When two conscious experi-
ences are indistinguishable for a subject, then the experiences are of
the same specific psychological kind. So, for example, if my genuine
perception of the snow-covered churchyard and my hallucination of
the snow-covered churchyard are indistinguishable for me, then these
experiences are of the same specific psychological kind.
It may not yet be clear why each of these assumptions is plausible; they will
be defended in the next section. But we must first demonstrate why they
are inconsistent.
Consider, then, a perceptual experience E of object O. By assumption (1),
O must be a mind-independent object. By (2), the nature of E is partly de-
termined by the nature of O itself. Assumption (3) says that there could be
an experience which is subjectively indistinguishable from E but where no
mind-independent object is being perceived; so a fortiori, O is not per-
ceived. Call this experience E*. It follows that E and E* have different es-
sential natures: for the nature of E is partly determined by the nature of O,
and the nature of E* cannot be. But this is inconsistent with assumption
(4), which implies that E and E* are experiences of the very same specific
psychological kind, since they are subjectively indistinguishable. The ques-
tion then is: how can the nature of a perceptual experience essentially de-
pend on the mind-independent objects of experience if it is possible for an
experience of the very same specific kind to exist in the absence of these
objects? The obvious answer is: it can’t. And yet perceptual experience
does seem essentially to involve a dependence on mind-independent ob-
jects: experience is our paradigm the mind’s ‘openness’ to the mind-in-
dependent world. The problem of how to resolve this contradiction is what
I am calling the problem of perception.
A few things need to be clarified before we proceed. First, it is important
to realise that the first three assumptions taken together are not inconsis-
tent. The first says that the object of experience E is a mind-independent
object O. The second says that the nature of E is partly determined by how
things are with O. The third says that there could be an experience E* sub-
jectively indistinguishable from E in the absence of the perceived O. There
is no inconsistency here. If E is a perception, then all that follows from as-
sumptions (1)-(3) is that there can be an experience which is subjectively
indistinguishable from a perception but which is not a perception.
Second, the assumptions talk about the ‘nature’ of an experience. What I
mean by this is its nature from the point of view of the subject having the
experience – rather than, say, its physiological nature as a brain state (if ex-
periences are brain states at all; see Noë, 2002 for criticism of this idea).
The nature of an experience from the subject’s point of view is also called
the ‘phenomenal character’ of the experience. A description of the phe-
nomenal character of an experience is a description of what it is like to
have an experience. But this talk of ‘what it is like’ to have an experience is
not intended to imply that it should be understood in terms of ‘qualia’ or
non-intentional properties of experience.
Third, it is important that assumption (4) talks in terms of specific psycho-
logical kinds. For the claim is not that there is some loose heterogenous
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kind under which E and E* fall; but that they fall under some specific kind.
Otherwise it would be easy to give the following ‘deflationary’ response to
the problem:
»Events E and E* both fall under a kind K – say, the kind picked out by the term ‘experience’
– so what is wrong with saying that some members of K are object-involving and others are
not? After all, if two events fall under one kind, this does not mean that they have to fall un-
der all the same kinds.«
This deflationary response would dissolve the puzzle; but it would only do
so by failing to recognise that the kind under which E and E* fall, accord-
ing to assumption (4), is intended to be the most specific psychological
kind. The point may be expressed in the terminology of determinate and
determinables (see Yablo, 1992 for this distinction). ‘Conscious experience’
picks out a determinable kind: there are many more determinate kinds fal-
ling under it: ‘visual experience’ picks out a determinate of this determin-
able. A visual experience of a rabbit is yet more determinate; of a white
rabbit from a certain orientation even more so; and so on. The identity of
subjective indistinguishables is intended to apply to the most determinate
kind of experience. The reason for this is the plausible (though, as we shall
see, controversial) thought that experiences are subjective states, in the
sense that how they seem to a subject of experience exhausts how they are
(see Kripke, 1980 lecture 3). So if there is a difference in experience which
is subjectively detectable then we have not reached the most determinate
psychological kind of experience. The fourth assumption says that when
two experiences do not differ in this way, then they are of the most deter-
minate kind.
Finally, something needs to be said about this problem of perception re-
lates to the traditional ‘argument from illusion’. As a number of writers
have noted (see e.g. Snowdon, 1992; Smith, 2002: 8) many things have been
called ‘the argument from illusion’, including some versions of the argu-
ment I have just outlined. But there is one clear line of argument which is
distinct from the one outlined, which runs roughly as follows. We all know
that things can appear to be other than they really are; when how things
appear to be conflicts with how they are, then the things we are aware of in
appearance must be different from the mind-independent objects we take
ourselves to be perceiving; so the immediate objects of perception must be
mind-dependent (see Robinson, 1994: 31). Smith (2002) distinguishes this
argument for mind-dependent objects of experience from the argument
based on the possibility of hallucination. A full treatment of perception
should discuss this former argument too; but here I will restrict myself
mainly to the problem which arises out of the possibility of hallucination,
since it seems to me that this presents a more difficult and deeper problem
for any attempt to give a satisfactory account of perception which preserves
its ordinary appearance to us. It is essentially this problem which Valberg
(1992) calls ‘the puzzle of experience’. And both Smith (2002) and Robin-
son (1994) see their various ‘arguments from hallucination’ (forms of the
problem presented here) as more powerful than the argument from illu-
sion. The conception of the problem of perception developed here draws
heavily on these authors, and especially on the detailed expositions in Mar-
tin (1995), (2000) and (2002). These writers present this problem of per-
ception in different ways, but all of them are variations on the theme as I
have presented it above: how to reconcile the manifest phenomenology of
241SYNTHESIS PHILOSOPHICA T. Crane, What is the Problem of Per-40 (2/2005) pp. (237–264) ception?

Finally, something needs to be said about this problem of perception re-
lates to the traditional ‘argument from illusion’. As a number of writers
have noted (see e.g. Snowdon, 1992; Smith, 2002: 8) many things have been
called ‘the argument from illusion’, including some versions of the argu-
ment I have just outlined. But there is one clear line of argument which is
distinct from the one outlined, which runs roughly as follows. We all know
that things can appear to be other than they really are; when how things
appear to be conflicts with how they are, then the things we are aware of in
appearance must be different from the mind-independent objects we take
ourselves to be perceiving; so the immediate objects of perception must be
mind-dependent (see Robinson, 1994: 31). Smith (2002) distinguishes this
argument for mind-dependent objects of experience from the argument
based on the possibility of hallucination. A full treatment of perception
should discuss this former argument too; but here I will restrict myself
mainly to the problem which arises out of the possibility of hallucination,
since it seems to me that this presents a more difficult and deeper problem
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(1992) calls ‘the puzzle of experience’. And both Smith (2002) and Robin-
son (1994) see their various ‘arguments from hallucination’ (forms of the
problem presented here) as more powerful than the argument from illu-
sion. The conception of the problem of perception developed here draws
heavily on these authors, and especially on the detailed expositions in Mar-
tin (1995), (2000) and (2002). These writers present this problem of per-
ception in different ways, but all of them are variations on the theme as I
have presented it above: how to reconcile the manifest phenomenology of
perception with the possibility of this kind of hallucination. (Martin, 2000
also shows how this problem has a common core with the earlier tradition
of 20th century philosophers who discussed perception in detail: Moore
(1905), (1910); Russell (1912); Price (1932) and Broad (1923); see Swartz
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The rest of this paper will be concerned with this conflict between the as-
sumptions (1)–(4). This problem is a phenomenological problem, in the
broad sense of having to do with how things appear to us. The way percep-
tion appears to us – in the sense of the general claims we would make
about it, having reflected on ordinary perceptual phenomena and our con-
cept of perception – is arguably, partly expressed in the claims (1)–(4)
above. But these claims seem to be inconsistent. This problem seems to be
distinct from the epistemological problem discussed above, of how percep-
tions can give us reasons for beliefs. In framing the problem, we employed
no assumptions about what can or cannot be a reason for a belief. Rather,
we seem to have discovered a deep incoherence within our idea of percep-
tion itself.
Of course, it may said that be that the reason the problem of perception is
so worrying is because we think that perceptions must be reasons for be-
liefs, and the problem of perception shows that they cannot be. On this
view, if it were not for the fact that perceptions must serve as reasons for
beliefs, then we should not be worried about the internal incoherence of
the idea of perception. This is not the approach which will be defended
here, but if you do take this approach, then you should regard the material
in this paper as a preface to what you regard to the genuine problem of
perception.
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It should also be noted that even if the problem of perception is not this
epistemological problem (the problem of reasons for belief) this does not
mean it has epistemological elements at all. For example, it is plausible
that the best way to understand one experience’s being subjectively indis-
tinguishable from another is in epistemological terms: experiences are in-
distinguishable when the subject is unable to tell them apart just on the ba-
sis of having them (see Martin, forthcoming). There is no sharp boundary
here to be drawn between epistemology and the theory of mind, and there
is no need for one; this paper is only concerned to distinguish the problem
of perception just outlined from the problem of how perceptions provide
reasons for empirical belief.
As Valberg (1992) argues, the problem of perception is a kind of antinomy:
we seem to have a good argument for the view that mind-independent ob-
jects are not essential to our perceptual experiences; but also we have over-
whelming pre-theoretical reasons to believe that they are. It may be thought,
however, that the assumptions which generated the problem are not as
overwhelmingly plausible as they have been presented. If that were so, and
we could happily reject one or more of them, then the problem would be
solved. So we need to examine the assumptions in more detail.
3. Mind-Independence
The mind-independence assumption says that when a subject has a percep-
tual experience as of an object or objects, the only object or objects per-
ceived – if any objects are perceived at all – are mind-independent objects.
This assumption needs to be clarified and then distinguished from various
similar but distinct ideas.
First, the clarifications. When assumption (1) talks of a ‘perceptual experi-
ence as of an object’ this is meant to apply to situations in which no actual
real object is experienced, as well as to situations in which objects are per-
ceived. We can accept for the sake of argument that that ‘x perceives y’ en-
tails the existence of y; but we can make the harmless stipulation that ‘x has
a perceptual experience as of y’ does not.
Second clarification: to say that only mind-independent objects are per-
ceived is to say, inter alia, that no mind-dependent objects are perceived.
On our ordinary way of thinking about perception, we do not think that we
are aware of ordinary material things by being aware of other objects; or
that we normally perceive objects by perceiving other objects; or that we
normally perceive certain objects in virtue of perceiving others. As we shall
see, many theories of perception have ended up advancing these claims
(see for instance, Jackson, 1977; Lowe, 1992). But these are supposed to be
surprising theoretical consequences, not part of a reflection upon common
sense.
The next clarification is that this assumption is, of course, meant to allow
that we also perceive the properties of objects, as well as the objects them-
selves. When I perceive the snow-covered churchyard, I perceive the white-
ness of the snow, the brownness of the wall behind, the crumbly texture of
the stone… and so on. Whether or not all these properties (e.g. the colours)
are mind-independent is not something which this paper will discuss. We
are considering the mind-independence of objects here, because if there
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were no mind-independent objects, there would be no mind-independent
properties either. For there could hardly be mind-independent properties
if there were no mind-independent objects of which they were properties.
Or so I shall assume here.
One final clarification. Up to now, I have been talking purely in terms of
visual perception. Does this mean that the mind-independence assumption
(and therefore the problem of perception) only concerns the sense of sight?
This question demands a more extensive discussion; but the short answer is
no. The immediate objects of the other senses are also mind-independent.
This is true even of those senses whose immediate objects are not particu-
lar physical objects, but (for example) smells and sounds. It is plausible to
say that we hear things by hearing sounds; therefore, sounds are the direct
objects of the sense of hearing. But sounds are not presented in experience
as mind-dependent, in the sense that they depend for their existence on
particular states or acts of mind. The sound of the coach is something
which others can hear (as revealed by my spontaneous unthinking surprise
when others cannot or do not hear what I hear). Likewise with smell. The
smell of the goulash is not presented as something which is dependent on
my smelling of it: it seems to me that others should be able to smell it too.
There are metaphysical views that deny any ultimate mind-independent re-
ality to sounds and smells, but these views too are attempts to revise our
ordinary way of thinking of these things. According to our ordinary way of
thinking, hearing, smell and taste have as their objects sounds, smells and
tastes: objects which are independent of the particular states of mind of the
person apprehending them. So the mind-independence claim applies to
them, mutatis mutandis. (For more on how the problem of perception,
somewhat differently construed, arises in the senses other than vision, see
Smith, 2002: 23–25; for important discussions of the sense of touch, see
O’Shaughnessy 1989 and Martin, 1992.)
I have said that it is part of our ordinary belief about perception that its ob-
jects are mind-independent in character. That this is so can be seen from
the fact that all (or almost all) serious theories of perception agree that our
perceptual experience seems as if it were an awareness of a mind-inde-
pendent world. One’s awareness of the objects of one’s perceptual experi-
ences does not seem to be an awareness of something which depends on
experience for their existence. A classic statement of this point of view as a
starting-point for the philosophy of perception is given in P.F. Strawson’s
Perception and its Objects (1979). Here Strawson argues that ‘mature sensi-
ble experience (in general) presents itself as, in Kantian phrase, an immedi-
ate consciousness of the existence of things outside us’ (1979: 97). He begins
his argument by asking how someone would typically respond to a request
for a description of their current visual experience. Strawson answers, su-
rely plausibly, that we might respond in something like the following way:
»I see the red light of the setting sun filtering through the black and thickly clustered branches
of the elms; I see the dappled deer grazing in groups on the vivid green grass…« (1979: 97).
There are two ideas implicit in this answer. One is that the description
talks about objects and properties which are, on the face of it, things dis-
tinct from this particular experience. The other is that the description is
rich, describing the nature of the experience in terms of concepts like deer
and elms and the setting sun. The description of the experience is not
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merely in terms of simple shapes and colours; but in terms of the things we
encounter in the ‘lived world’ in all their complexity. As Heidegger puts it,
»We never… originally and really perceive a throng of sensations, e.g., tones and noises, in
the appearance of things…; rather, we hear the storm whistling in the chimney, we hear the
three-engine aeroplane, we hear the Mercedes in immediate distinction from the Volks-
wagen. Much closer to us than any sensations are the things themselves. We hear the door
slam in the house, and never hear acoustic sensations or mere sounds.« (Heidegger 1977: 156)
It may be said that descriptions of experience like this involve a commit-
ment to the existence of things outside the experience; but surely it is possi-
ble to describe experience without this commitment? So let us suppose that
we ask our imagined perceiver to repeat their description without commit-
ting themselves to the existence of things outside their experience, but
without falsifying how their experience seemed to them. Strawson claims
that the best way for them to respond is to say »I had a visual experience
such as it would have been natural to describe by saying that I saw…«, and
then to add the previous description of the trees and the deer etc. We give
a description of our experience in terms of the ordinary objects of our
world. And we do this even if we are trying not to commit ourselves to the
existence of these objects. In M.G.F. Martin’s words:
»The public, mind-independent objects of perception and their features are not banished
from one’s attention just because one shifts one’s interest from how things are in the environ-
ment to how things are experientially.«’ (Martin, 2002: 384)
Strawson is at pains to point out that this is not a philosophical theory, one
that would (for example) refute scepticism about the external world.
Rather, it should be a starting point for philosophical reflection on experi-
ence (1979: 94). So it is important that this intuitive datum of conscious-
ness is not supposed to rule out idealist conceptions of perception (such as
that defended in Foster, 2000). As we shall see below, idealists will say that
the objects and properties perceived are in a certain way mind-dependent.
But this is consistent with saying that they are presented in experience as
mind-independent.
The mind-independence assumption, however, says more than that experi-
ence presents its objects as mind-independent; it says that they are mind-
independent. That is, it is part of our commonsense conception of percep-
tion that the objects and properties we experience when we do perceive are
the objects and properties out there in the mind-independent world. As
Tyler Burge says,
»… our perceptual experience represents or is about objects… which are objective. That is to
say, their nature (or essential character) is independent of any one person’s actions, disposi-
tions or mental phenomena.« (Burge 1987: 125).
4. Object-Dependence
Strawson’s remarks about the intuitive starting point for discussions of per-
ception are also relevant to our second assumption: that when a subject has
a perceptual experience of an object, the nature of the experience is partly
determined by the nature of the actual object currently being perceived.
For, to echo Strawson, if I want to describe what it is like to experience the
churchyard now, I describe the churchyard itself, as it is at this moment:
the collapsed gravestones, the crumbling statues, the snow starting to melt
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around the sides of the grass. The phenomenological point here is that
when we reflect upon how our experience is, and try to ‘turn inwards’ to
describe the nature of the experience itself, the best way to answer is by
describing the objects of experience and how they seem to us. As Valberg
puts it, when we take this kind of reflective attitude to our experience, ‘all
we find is the world’ (1992a, p. 18). When we try to describe an experience
in its intrinsic nature, an advance of having any specific theory of what the
intrinsic nature of experience is, we describe the objects and properties
which are experienced. Starting from this phenomenological point, already
defended in the previous section, our second assumption involves the move
to the conclusion that the way these objects actually are is part of what de-
termines the phenomenal character of an experience.
Why believe the object-dependence assumption? The intuitive basis behind
it, I believe, is the idea that when an object is experienced in perception, it
is ‘there’ or ‘given’ or ‘present to the mind’ in a way in which it is not in
other mental states. Here I do not mean merely that the verb ‘perceives’ is
factive: in the sense that a claim of the form ‘S perceives that p’ entails p.
This is true; but ‘S knows that p’ is factive too. Yet the objects of know-
ledge do not, as such, have ‘presence’ in the relevant sense – except of
course in the case when one knows something is there by seeing it. (This
‘presence’ is the phenomenon Scott Sturgeon calls ‘scene immediacy’: 2000,
chapter 1.)
What is this perceptual presence? One way to approach this question is to
consider the differences between perception and pure thought (i.e. thought
which is non-perceptual). Our first assumption, mind-independence, does
nothing to distinguish perception from pure thought, since in thinking about
the mind-independent world my thought too presents mind-independent
objects (see, e.g., Searle, 1983: 16). Thought, so to speak, goes straight out
to the object itself. And the object itself is (normally) something mind-
independent, in the case of thought as much as in the case of perception.
The difference is that in the case of thought how the actual object of
thought is at the moment I am thinking of it does not in any way constrain
my thinking of it; but in the case of perception it does. My perception of
the churchyard is immediately responsive to how the churchyard is now, as
I am perceiving it. But my (non-perceptual) thought need not be: in the
middle of winter, I can imagine the churchyard as it is in spring, I can con-
sider it covered in autumn leaves, and I can think of it in all sorts of ways
which are not the ways it presently is. I can think of all these things in their
absence. This is not available in perception, because perception can only
confront what is presently given: in this sense, you can only see what is
there. It is because of this that perception is said to have an immediacy or
vividness which thought lacks: this vividness derives from the fact that per-
ceived objects and their properties are actually given to the perceiver when
being perceived, and determine the nature of the experience. This is the
underlying idea behind the second assumption.
Notice that the assumption does not say that the phenomenal character of
one’s entire experience is exhausted (or completely determined) by the na-
ture of the actual objects and qualities which are presented in an experi-
ence. Such an assertion is implausible and easily refuted. A scene can look
very different when one removes one’s glasses: my perceptual experience
of the churchyard then becomes hazy and blurred, the contours of objects
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become indistinct. But this difference in experience need not derive from a
difference in the objects of experience. This does not mean that the second
assumption is false; it just means that not all phenomenal differences in ex-
perience are differences in the objects of the experience. Rather, some
phenomenal differences are differences in the ways in which those objects
are experienced.
This kind of case is not plausibly classified as a case of perceptual error or
misperception. When I take my glasses off, I need not take the perceived
churchyard to be different in any way. Nor need I be misrepresenting (and
therefore representing) the things in the churchyard as having blurry
boundaries. Rather, this might be described as a case where things can
seem different without seeming to be different. It is consistent with the
object-dependence assumption that one’s experience has other phenome-
nal aspects which are not aspects of how the objects of the experience seem
to be. But this does raise the question of how we should understand the
properties apparently instantiated in experience (e.g. blurriness) if they are
not, and not experienced as, properties of the objects of experience. For
surely, in an experience like this, there is blurriness instantiated somewhere:
something is blurry. But if the mind-independent churchyard is not blurry,
what is? Perhaps one could say that the blurriness is a property which
emerges out of the relation between the perceiver – whose sense-organs are
constituted in a certain way – and the mind-independent churchyard. It is
the fact that I (with my bad eyesight) am looking at this churchyard (with
objects and properties arranged in a certain way) that my experience has
the character that it does. Although this suggestion is vague, it may well be
on the right track; but notice we cannot say this sort of thing about the case
of hallucination, where there is no mind-independent object being per-
ceived at all, and therefore nothing to be related to.
This problem will be discussed further below, when we come to consider
how theories of perception come to deal with the problem of perception.
This section has only been concerned to demonstrate the initial plausibility
of the assumption.
5. The Possibility of Hallucination
Despite the rather elaborate expositions of these principles just given, the
first two assumptions are not intended to be highly theoretical claims;
rather, they are meant to be something which becomes obvious with a little
reflection upon experience. The third assumption, that hallucinations of a
certain kind are possible, depends on a little (but not much) theorising
about experience. Remember that the claim is that it is possible to have an
experience of an object as having a certain property, F, even if there is no
such object; and such an experience is subjectively indistinguishable from a
veridical perception of a real object being F. The idea of an experience of
this kind which is subjectively indistinguishable from a perception is what is
meant by a ‘hallucination’ in this context.
’Subjectively indistinguishable’ could be understood in a number of ways. It
could be understood in terms of the experiences sharing subjective non-
intentional qualities or ‘qualia’ (Shoemaker, 1990; Loar, 2003) or in terms
of the experiences sharing their ‘narrow’ or non-environment-dependent
intentional content (see Davies, 1991 and 1992 for a discussion of this
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idea). But it is important to emphasise that, as Martin (forthcoming) has
shown, one does not have to accept these substantial theories of experience
in order to accept the idea of hallucination; so one cannot reject the possi-
bility of hallucination by objecting to the coherence or plausibility of these
theories. All one has to accept is the uncontroversial idea of two experi-
ences being such that a subject could not know, simply in virtue of having
the experiences, whether they were having one or the other.
But although the idea of distinct experiences being subjectively indistin-
guishable is not itself problematic, some philosophers have balked at the
idea that any genuine perception could really be subjectively indistinguish-
able from a hallucination. Some are worried about this idea because they
have an ‘externalist’ theory of the intentional content of mental states
which entails that hallucinations must be necessarily exceptional; it would
not be possible to be a subject who was in a state of perpetual hallucination
(see McCulloch, 2002, chapter 7). But this idea, whatever its other merits,
is beside the point here. The possibility of hallucination, assumption (3) of
the problem of perception, does not say that someone could be hallucinat-
ing all the time. Assumption (3) is consistent with the most extreme exter-
nalist theory of mental content. (Though as we shall see in 3.3, the con-
junction of (3) and (4) is not.)
Others have questioned the methodology employed when talking about
hallucinations. They are sceptical about the empirical facts underlying as-
sumption (3): do we really know that such mental states can come about?
Are not all real hallucinations – whether the product of drugs, psychosis or
dehydration etc. – radically different in their phenomenal character from
genuine perceptions? So why should we be so confident that there can
even be subjectively indistinguishable perceptions and hallucinations? Aus-
tin (1962) played on the fact that there are real phenomenal differences
between genuine perceptions and actual delusory and hallucinatory experi-
ences in his dismissal of philosophers’ characteristic ‘arguments from illu-
sion’ in the theory of perception. To say that there could be hallucinations
in our sense is akin to the Cartesian fantasy that there could be dreams
which are subjectively indistinguishable from real experiences. But, Austin
points out, dreaming that one is being presented to the Pope is nothing like
really being presented to the Pope (1962: 48–49). And likewise, it might be
said, with hallucinations. We do not really know whether there can be such
things, this methodological objection runs, so we should not base our
philosophical theorising on such shaky empirical and introspective founda-
tions.
But this kind of objection, too, is beside the point. Our assumption about
hallucinations does not say that there ever actually are any such hallucina-
tions, and nor does it rely in its description of the relevant kind of halluci-
nation on any actual facts about real hallucinations. It just asserts the bare
metaphysical possibility of an experience of the kind in question. This
seems to be a possibility which resides within our idea of experience. How-
ever, it might reasonably be asked how we know this. The best way to an-
swer is to appeal to a broad and uncontroversial empirical fact about expe-
rience: that it is the upshot or outcome of a causal process linking the or-
gans of perception with the environment. This claim is not, as Valberg
makes clear (1992: 24), the same as a causal theory of perception, which
aims to give an analysis of the concept of perception in causal terms. It is a
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substantially weaker idea: it is just the assertion of the fact that our experi-
ences are the effects of things going on inside and outside our bodies. If
this is so, then we can understand why hallucinations are a possibility. For
any causal chain reaching from a cause C1 to effect E, there are intermedi-
ate causes C2, C3 etc., such that E could have been brought about even if
C1 had not been there but one of the later causes. If this is true of causal
processes in general, and perceptual experience is the product of a causal
process, then we can see how it is possible that I could have an experience
of the churchyard which was brought about by causes ‘downstream’ of the
actual cause, the churchyard.
So the possibility of hallucination does rest on a broadly empirical assump-
tion: that experience is the product of a causal process. One could reject
the possibility of hallucination only, it seems, by rejecting this empirical
claim, and asserting either that experience is not the effect of some causal
process at all, or that there are non-causal conditions which somehow de-
termine how an experience is. Neither option is very plausible.
6. The Identity of Subjective Indistinguishables
The final assumption in our formulation of the problem is that two experi-
ences which are subjectively indistinguishable are experiences of the same
kind. Therefore, my hallucination of the snow-covered churchyard is a
mental state of the same kind as my veridical perception of the actual
churchyard. What can be said in favour of this assumption?
Some philosophers will argue that this is implied by the best theory of our
mental life (see, for example, Farkas, 2003). Our best way of distinguishing
the things we classify as mental, it is claimed, must derive from the way we
know about these things: we know our mental life with a kind of authority
which we do not have over any other realm of knowledge. This approach is
sometimes called ‘Cartesian’, because of its claimed origin in Descartes’s
ideas about how to distinguish a mental substance, with its principal attrib-
ute thought, from a material substance, with its principle attribute exten-
sion. It is worth pointing out that the approach can survive independently
of Descartes’s specific ideas about the differences between mental and
physical substances, and it need not assume Descartes’s dualism. Nonethe-
less, this Cartesian approach has encountered a lot of criticism in recent
philosophy of mind, especially since the rise of externalist theories of mind
(see Pessin and Goldberg, 1996 for a collection of readings on the externa-
list view of mind). The Cartesian view is a controversial theory of mind. So
if our problem of perception depended on the Cartesian view of mind, as
some believe (McDowell, 1982 suggests something like this), then the
problem might be easily solved; or at least, the debate can be transformed
into one over the merits of the Cartesian view in general, and nothing spe-
cific to the philosophy of perception.
Unfortunately, the problem of perception cannot be dismissed so easily.
For the assumption can be defended on weaker premises than the Carte-
sian theory provides. Here we can identify two kinds of argument: one
from the metaphysics of mind, and another from principles behind ordi-
nary psychological explanation.
The metaphysical argument would proceed first by arguing that we have
reasons, independent of the philosophy of perception, to believe that men-
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tal states or events are dependent on physical states or events in the brain
(the qualification ‘states or events’ will now be dropped, but should be
taken as understood). This kind of dependence is a form of physicalism
about the mental, weaker than the traditional identity theory and it is often
expressed as a ‘local supervenience’ thesis: no two mental events or states
of a thinker can differ without there being some local physical difference in
the brain of the thinker (see Kim, 1993; and Crane, 2001 chapter 2 for an
account of identity theories and other forms of physicalism). The converse
of this supervenience thesis is the idea that two identical local physical
states in the brain of the thinker will give rise to identical mental states.
Suppose we accept this local supervenience thesis. Then it follows that re-
producing the local physical state which is of the same type as the proxi-
mate cause of a genuine perception will also reproduce the supervening
mental state. According to assumption (3), the genuine perception has a
cause C* which is purely local to the thinker’s brain, although this cause is
itself dependent on causes external to the thinker. C* lies along the causal
chain stretching from the object of perception to the inner state of the visu-
al cortex which, we may assume, is the physical end-point of the perceptual
process. Assumption (3) implies that replicating C* will replicate an expe-
rience E* which is subjectively indistinguishable from a genuine perception
E. The local supervenience thesis says that replicating physical states will
produce mental events of the same mental kind. It follows that the subjec-
tively indistinguishable states E* and E must be mental states of the same
kind. This is our third assumption.
We can reach the same conclusion by considering, not the metaphysics of
mind and the physicalist thesis of supervenience, but our everyday practice
of psychological explanation. People’s intentional actions, we tend to think,
are explained by their psychological states. We cite how they believe the
world to be and what they desire to happen in explaining why people do
what they do. Some philosophers argue that our understanding of same-
ness and difference of mental states is derived from their role in psycho-
logical explanation: similar actions from similar agents are explained in the
same way, by citing the same underlying psychological states (for this the-
me in the philosophy of mind, see Lycan, 1999, part V). We can also cite
subjects’ perceptual experiences of the world as explanatory of their actions:
one reason for this is that what people believe about the world is often de-
termined by their perceptual experiences. Thus we might say that a subject
who genuinely perceives a glass of wine in front of him might reach out to
drink it because it seemed to him that it was there and he fancied a drink;
but someone who is unknowingly hallucinating a glass of wine in front of
him might do exactly the same thing, because he fancied the same thing
and things seemed the same to him. If we identify mental states as the
same when (ceteris paribus) they lead to the same action, then we have a
reason to count the hallucination E* as the same kind of mental state as
the genuine perception E. This is another reason for the common kind as-
sumption. (For arguments of this kind, in connection with the doctrine of
externalism, see Segal 1989. For a defence of the externalist response that
externalist, relational states – like knowledge and perception construed as
(2) does – actually provide better explanations than internalist, intrinsic
states, see Williamson, 2000: 60–64; see also Yablo, 1997.)
This completes the exposition of the problem of perception. The exposi-
tion has been lengthy, but this has been necessary because of the complex
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structure of the problem, and also in the light of the dismissal of it which
one finds in much philosophical literature (especially that influenced by
Austin, 1962). The paradox or antinomy we have unearthed comes from
the fact that if experiences E and E* are the same kind of mental state,
then it cannot be that one essentially involves the existence of the object
perceived, and the other doesn’t. We shall finally consider of how philoso-
phers have attempted to dissolve this antinomy.
7. The Sense-Datum Theory
The problem of perception derives from a conflict between the four as-
sumptions. So the natural way to respond to the problem is to show that,
contrary to appearances, not all of the assumptions are true. Following
Martin (1995, 2000, 2002), it can be shown that all of the main theories of
perception which have arisen in the twentieth century involve a denial of
one of these assumptions, or assumptions very like them. Martin (2002:
421) persuasively argues that each theory of perception is an ‘error theory’
of perception (in J.L. Mackie’s, 1977 sense). Each theory convicts common
sense of an error about perception. The strategy adopted in this section is
an application of this idea of Martin’s. It will first be shown, in the rest of
this section, that the sense-datum theory denies assumption (1), the inten-
tionalist theory denies assumption (2), the disjunctivist theory denies as-
sumption (4). It is worth noting that, with the exception of the sceptical ap-
proach to the methodology of the philosophy of perception discussed
above (2.3), no serious theory denies assumption (3), the possibility of hal-
lucination. This fact supports the present conception of the problem of
perception. For the problem may be epitomised as: how should we con-
ceive of perception, given the possibility of hallucination? The possibility of
hallucination functions as the starting point for the problem.
The sense-datum theory solves the problem of perception as follows. It is
true that (2) the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences depends
upon the nature of the objects of experience; it is true too that (3) halluci-
nations are possible, and, because of (4), they are the states of mind of the
same determinate kind as perceptions. But these are consistent because (1)
is false: it is not true that the only objects which are perceived are mind-
independent objects. Hallucination was defined as a state in which one is
aware of no mind-independent object, yet one is standing in an awareness
relation to something, that something must be a mind-dependent object: the
mind-independence assumption is false. Rather, mind-dependent objects
are perceived in hallucination and in perception, and the phenomenal cha-
racter of the experience is determined by the nature of these objects. These
objects are sense-data (plural; the singular is ‘sense-datum’): mind-dependent
objects of experience (see Broad, 1923, Moore, 1905, 1910; Price, 1932).
The sense-datum theory need not deny that we are presented with objects
as if they were mind-independent. But it will insist that this is an error. The
things we take ourselves to be aware of are actually mind-dependent, alt-
hough they may not normally seem like that. This is an important point,
since it shows that the sense-datum theories are not simply refuted by
pointing to the phenomenological fact that the objects of experience do
not seem to be mind-dependent sense-data. A consistent sense-data theo-
rist can accept this fact, but insist that what seem to be mind-independent
entities are really sense-data.
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So the sense-datum theory denies (1): that the only objects which are per-
ceived are mind-independent objects, since mind-dependent objects are
the immediate objects of perception. But it can say that we are indirectly
aware of these objects: that is, aware of them by being aware of sense-data.
A sense-datum theorist who says this is known as an indirect realist or repre-
sentative realist, or someone who holds a representative theory of perception
(see Jackson, 1977, Lowe, 1992). A theorist who denies that we are aware
of mind-independent objects at all, directly or indirectly, but only of sense-
data is known as a phenomenalist or an idealist about perception (see Fos-
ter, 2000 for a recent defence of this view).
The difference between indirect realism and idealism is not over the truth
of (1), or over any other thesis specific to the theory of perception. The dif-
ference between them is over the metaphysical issue of whether there are
any mind-independent objects at all. Idealists, in general, hold that all
objects and properties are mind-dependent. There are many forms of
idealism, and many arguments for these different forms, and there is no
room for an extensive discussion of idealism here. What is important in
this context is that idealists and indirect realists can agree about the nature
of perception considered in itself, but will normally disagree on grounds in-
dependent of the philosophy of perception about whether the mind-de-
pendent sense-data are all there is. Thus Foster (2000) argues for his idea-
lism first by arguing for sense-data as the immediate or direct objects of
perceptual experience, and then arguing that idealism gives a better expla-
nation of the reality underlying this appearance, and of our knowledge of
it. Hence, idealism and indirect realism are grouped together here as ‘the
sense-datum theory’ since they agree about the fundamental issue in the
philosophy of perception.
The sense-datum theory accepts (2): that the phenomenal character of an
experience is determined by the nature of its objects. But it holds that
these objects are mind-dependent objects (so ‘object’ in (2) does not mean
‘mind-independent object’). A sense-datum theory can argue for this claim
by holding that whenever a sensible quality is present in experience, there
must be an object which instantiates this quality. Remember the blurry ex-
perience of the churchyard. The sense-datum theory will say that there is
definitely something which is blurry: but it is not the churchyard. So it must
be something else, not identical to the churchyard. The principle behind
this reasoning is what Howard Robinson calls the ‘phenomenal principle’:
»If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which possesses a particular sensible
quality then there is something of which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible
quality.« (1994: 32)
If we assume the possibility of hallucination (3), it follows that there is an
object in the case of hallucination too. The object of a hallucination cannot
be a mind-independent object since bringing the experience into existence
is sufficient to bring the object into existence. And since, assuming (4), the
perception is a state of the same kind as a hallucinatory state of mind, the
same kind of object must be brought into existence by the state of mind.
Hence the immediate objects of perception are mind-dependent objects.
And hence the sense-datum theory treats the objects of experience as con-
stituents of the experience. The experience itself is a relational fact; but the
distinctive claim of the sense-datum theory is not simply that a relation
holds between the subject and the object. Rather, it is that the experience
itself is partly constituted by the object.
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The sense-datum theory was much discussed in the first half of the 20th
century (see references above; and Martin, 2000 for a historical discussion).
It was widely rejected in the second half of the 20th century, though it still
had its occasional champions in this period (for some examples, see Jack-
son, 1977, O’Shaughnessy, 1980, Lowe, 1992, Robinson, 1994). The sense-
datum theory is normally dismissed today, for many reasons. Some of these
are objections specifically to the indirect realist version of the sense-datum
theory: for example, the claim that the theory gives rise to an unacceptable
‘veil of perception’ between the mind and the world. This would not be an
objection to the idealist version of the theory. Other objections rest upon
controversial doctrines from elsewhere in philosophy, for example, Wittgen-
stein’s objection to the idea of a ‘private object’ (see Robinson, 1994 for
some responses to these kinds of objection). But perhaps the most influen-
tial objection, rarely explicitly stated but present in the background of
much discussion, stems from the prevailing naturalism of contemporary
philosophy: although there is, perhaps, nothing incoherent in the very idea
of mind-dependent objects being brought into existence by experiences,
nonetheless it is incompatible with other things we know about the natural
world. If it were possible to have a theory of perception which made the
best of the conception of perception embodied in our assumptions above,
but which did not commit itself to mind-dependent objects, then, natura-
lists say, we should look elsewhere.
8. Intentionalism
The intentionalist theory of perception solves the problem of perception as
follows. It is true that (1), when an object is actually perceived, it is mind-
independent. And it is also true that (3) hallucinations are possible, and
that, given (4), they are of the same determinate psychological kind as per-
ceptions. So it follows that a state of this kind, a perceptual experience,
could exist in the absence of the relevant mind-independent object. But
there is no inconsistency here because (2) is false: it is not true that the
phenomenal character of a perceptual experience is partly determined by
the nature of the object of experience since an experience could have that
phenomenal character, even if no such object existed.
The intentionalist theory of perception is a generalisation of an idea pre-
sented in Anscombe (1965), and the ‘belief theories’ of Armstrong (1968)
and Pitcher (1970). Anscombe had drawn attention to the fact that percep-
tual verbs satisfy the tests for non-extensionality or intensionality (see Cra-
ne, 2001 chapter 1 for an exposition of these notions). For example, just as
I can think about something which does not exist, so I can have an experi-
ence of something which does not exist. Anscombe regarded the error of
sense-data and direct realist theories of perception as the failure to recog-
nise this intensionality.
Armstrong and Pitcher argued that perception is a form of belief. (More
precisely, they argued that it is the acquisition of a belief, since this is a con-
scious event, as perceiving is; rather than a state or condition, as belief is.
But for simplicity I will take this qualification as read in what follows.) Be-
lief is an intentional state in the sense that it represents the world to be a
certain way, and the way it represents the world to be is said to be its inten-
tional content. Perception, it was argued, is similarly a representation of the
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world, and the way it represents the world to be is likewise its intentional
content. When I visually experience that the churchyard is covered with
snow, the content of my experience is how things are represented to be: viz.
that the churchyard is covered with snow. But just as I can believe that a is
F without there being any thing which is F, so I can have a perceptual expe-
rience that a is F without there being any thing which is F. This is a reason
for saying that perception is just a form of belief-acquisition.
Everyone will agree that perception does give rise to beliefs about the envi-
ronment. But there are a number of reasons for thinking that perception
should not be understood purely in terms of the acquisition of belief. One
obvious reason, discussed by Armstrong, is that one can have a perceptual
illusion that things are a certain way even when one knows they are not
(this phenomenon is sometimes called ‘the persistence of illusion’). The fa-
mous Müller-Lyer illusion presents two lines of equal length as if they were
unequal. One can experience this even if one knows (and therefore be-
lieves) that the lines are the same length. If perception were simply the
acquisition of belief, then this would be a case of explicitly contradictory
beliefs: one believes that the lines are the same length and that they are
different lengths. But this is surely not the right way to describe this situa-
tion. In the situation as described, one does not believe, in any sense, that
the lines are different lengths. (Armstrong recognised this, and re-descri-
bed perception as a ‘potential belief’; this marks a significant retreat from
the original claim and it arguably amounts to a retraction.)
However, it seems that what is significant about the belief theory of per-
ception is not so much its claim that perception is belief, but that it is an in-
tentional state; for many states of mind other than belief are intentional.
An intentional state is a state of mind with an intentional content; that is, it
involves some representation of the world as being a certain way. Like be-
lief, perception represents certain things as being the case in the mind-
independent world. When things are like this, then the things which are
perceived are the usual mind-independent objects which can also be the
objects of belief. The intentionalist theory of perception accepts assump-
tion (1).
But the intentionalist theory of perception rejects the second assumption:
that the nature of an experience is partly determined by the nature of its
object. This is because the only objects they allow there to be are mind-
independent objects – but in the case of hallucination, there is no mind-
independent object being perceived. And they accept assumption (4): per-
ception and hallucination are states of the same determinate kind. But
what is this kind? The intentionalist can say something like this: it is the
state of sensorily representing that things are a certain way. In our example, it
is the state of visually representing that there is a snow-covered churchyard
outside the window – a state which someone could be in whether or not
there is such a churchyard.
Intentionalists can say the same kind of thing about perceptual error which
is not hallucination. If the snow appears to me to be grey and muddy, but
in fact it is in shadow, then the intentionalist will say that my experience
represents the snow to be grey and muddy, when in fact it is not. Here, as
in the case of hallucination, Robinson’s Phenomenal Principle is rejected
just as it would be for belief: for no-one thinks that the Principle would
have any plausibility if ‘it sensorily appears to a subject that…’ were re-
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placed by ‘if a subject believes…’. However, intentionalists should not say
that the case of blurry vision need be a case of the subject misrepresenting
the world as blurry. To explain phenomena like this they sometimes appeal
to intrinsic, non-representational features of experience (called ‘qualia’):
the blurriness is a property of the experience itself, not of its intentional ob-
ject (for qualia, see 3.4.1 below). But some intentionalists try and avoid
positing such qualia (see Tye, 2002).
It might seem odd to attribute to intentionalists the denial of object-de-
pendence, since many intentionalists are also externalists about intentional
content: that is, they deny the local supervenience of the intentional on the
physical. In other words, externalists hold that two perceivers who are in-
trinsically or locally identical in all their physical properties need not be in
the same intentional states. This is because subjects’ intentional states de-
pend on the nature of their environment (see Pessin and Goldberg /eds./,
1996). It might be thought, then, that an externalist intentionalist should
embrace object-dependence rather then reject it.
But as we shall see, the only kind of externalist who embraces object-
dependence in our sense is a disjunctivist: for only they can consistently say
that the state which one has when one is perceiving an object is of the kind
which cannot be had when hallucinating. Intentionalist externalists will
typically say something weaker (for discussion, see Davies, 1992). If they
base their externalism on considerations such as Putnam’s twin earth argu-
ment, or on the teleological theory or the causal theories of content, they
are only obliged to say that intentional states depend for their existence
and nature on the environment in general. This is consistent with saying
that one can be in an intentional state which concerns a particular object,
and yet that state need not depend for its existence or nature upon how
things are with that particular object at that moment. Thus an externalist
can consistently say (a) that one cannot have intentional states whose con-
tents concern water, for example, if one’s environment did not contain wa-
ter; and (b) that one could be in the same state of mind as one is in when
perceiving this glass of water, even if the particular glass of water does not
exist – or is somewhere quite invisible to you – at the moment one is per-
ceiving it. The key idea here is that object-dependence (assumption (2)) is
described in terms of how the perceived object currently is – i.e. at the time
of the experience. Intentionalism about perception is committed to deny-
ing that how an object is at the time of an experience is essential to the
phenomenal character of an experience.
Hence the issue is not simply whether the existence of the experience en-
tails or presupposes the existence of its object. Suppose for the sake of ar-
gument that experience essentially involves the exercise of recognitional
capacities, and I have a capacity to recognise the Queen. Let’s suppose too
that this is a general capacity which presupposes her existence. It is consis-
tent with this to say that I could be in the same intentional state when I am
hallucinating the Queen, as when I am perceiving her. Although the capac-
ity might depend for its existence on the Queen’s existence, not every exer-
cise of the capacity need depend on the Queen’s perceptual presence. The
capacity can ‘misfire’. And if this is true, the object-dependence assump-
tion is false: since how the Queen is at the moment of the experience need
not even partially determine how my hallucinatory experience is. This is
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entirely consistent with externalism as a general theory of intentional con-
tent.
An externalist intentionalist might attempt to do justice to the role of par-
ticular objects in perception by holding that in any particular veridical ex-
perience, the actual object perceived is a constituent. They can say this be-
cause the content of the experience is given by an open sentence; we can
therefore think of the object of experience, in the veridical case, as being
the value of the free variable in that sentence. (For this proposal, see
Burge, 1991; see also Martin, 2003, who argues that the availability of this
position shows how an intentionalist can accommodate the particularity of the
objects of experience.) In this sense, particular objects are essential to some
particular experiences, in the sense that without the object, it would not be
that particular experience – since that particular experience is, as a matter of
fact, veridical. But nonetheless, another experience can have the same content
– what is given by the open sentence – in the case where no object is there. (In
this case, the experience’s content would lack a truth-value.)
This is an important version of intentionalism, but it is worth emphasising
that it still is committed to the denial of assumption (2) since it holds that
the nature of a perceptual experience of an object need not be determined
by how the object is (in the case where there is no object perceived). And
moreover, the position holds that a hallucination and a perception can
share content; and given that having the same content is the fundamental
way of classifying psychological states as the same, the position can hold
that hallucinations and perceptions are of the same psychological kind. In
effect, then, this intentionalist position is committed to the truth of (2) for
veridical perception. But that is, of course, something that all intentionalists
should accept: if you replace ‘perceptual experience’ with ‘veridical percep-
tion’ in (2) then it is plainly true. The question is whether it is true for per-
ceptual experience. Intentionalists say no; sense-data theorists and (as we
shall see) disjunctivists say yes.
Given intentionalism’s acceptance of the first assumption (mind-indepen-
dence), it is easy to understand what is present to the mind in the case of
veridical perception: the churchyard, the snow etc. But what should be said
about what is presented in the hallucinatory case? As we have seen, inten-
tionalists typically say that experiences are representations; and one can
represent what does not exist (see Harman, 1990, Tye, 1992). This is cer-
tainly true; but isn’t there any more to be said? For how does a representa-
tion of a non-existent churchyard differ from a representation of a non-
existent garbage dump, say, when one of those is hallucinated?
One proposal is that the objects of hallucinatory experience is the proper-
ties which the hallucinated object is presented as having (Johnston, 2003).
Another answer, deriving from ideas of Husserl’s, is to say that these hallu-
cinatory states of mind have merely ‘intentional objects’ (Smith, 2002, chap-
ter 9). This idea cannot be dealt with here in detail, but it is important to
realise that intentional objects are not supposed to be entities or things of
any kind. When we talk about perception and its ‘objects’ in this context,
we mean the word in the way it occurs in the phrase ‘object of thought’ or
‘object of attention’ and not as it occurs in the phrase ‘physical object’. So
in this context, ‘object’ does not mean ‘thing’, any more than ‘object of
thought’ means ‘thing of thought’ (see Valberg, 1992: 22). An intentional
object is always an object for a subject, and this is not a way of classifying
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things in reality. Hence Smith’s appeal to intentional objects is consistent
with the denial of (2), since (2) talks about ‘actual objects’ and what is
meant is things. An intentionalist need not be committed to intentional ob-
jects in this sense; but if they are not, then they owe an account of the con-
tent of hallucinatory experiences.
This is one place at which the intentionalist theory needs to be developed.
Another place where more needs to be said is in their treatment of veridi-
cal perception. For the natural way for an intentionalist to explain the
veridicality of perception is to say that it is simply a matter of the truth of
the propositional content p reported in a propositional attitude report of
perception: S perceives that p. But if it is possible to have a hallucination
whose content is (as an accidental matter of fact) true, then the truth of the
propositional content cannot be sufficient for the veridicality of an experi-
ence. For example, suppose I am hallucinating a clock on the wall in front
of me, and it just so happens that there is a clock on the wall in that very
place (see Grice, 1961; Lewis, 1988). Such ‘veridical hallucinations’ present
a problem for the intentionalist’s way of construing veridicality: for in such
cases, there is a true proposition which is the content of the experience, but
the experience is not a veridical hallucination. The normal response is to
say that an experience counts as veridical (as a case of seeing, in the case of
visual experience) if there is an appropriate causal link between the experi-
ence and its object. But spelling out the appropriate causal link has proved
a difficult task; and, moreover, some philosophers (notably Snowdon,
1979–80) have argued that the concept of perception is not a causal concept.
Intentionalists still have work to do to make their theory fully coherent.
9. Disjunctivism
The disjunctivist theory of perception solves the problem of perception as
follows. It is true that (1) the objects of genuine perception are mind-
independent; and it is true that (2) the phenomenal character of an experi-
ence is partly determined by the nature of these objects. Certainly halluci-
nation is possible (assumption (3)). But this does not create an inconsis-
tency because (4) is false: genuine perception and a subjectively indistin-
guishable hallucination are not mental states of the same determinate psy-
chological kind. The possibility of hallucination (3) and the identity of sub-
jective indistinguishables (4) together imply what Martin (forthcoming)
calls the ‘common kind assumption’ about perception: ‘whatever kind of
mental event occurs when one is veridically perceiving some scene… that
kind of event can occur whether or not one is perceiving’. The disjunctivist
theory rejects the common kind assumption, because it rejects the identity
of subjective indistinguishables.
By denying (4), the disjunctive theory does not deny that there is some true
description under which both the perception of a rabbit and a subjectively
indistinguishable hallucination of a rabbit can fall. It is easy to provide such
a true description: both experiences are experiences which are subjectively
indistinguishable from a perception of a rabbit. Disjunctivists do not deny
that such a true description is available. What they deny is that what makes
it true that these two experiences are describable in this way is the presen-
ce of the same determinate mental state in the case of perception and hallu-
cination. In the case of the perception, what makes it true that the descrip-
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tion applies is that the experience is a perception of a rabbit; in the halluci-
natory case, what makes it true that the description applies is that the expe-
rience is a hallucination of a rabbit. What the disjunctivist rejects is what
J.M. Hinton calls ‘the doctrine of the »experience« as the common element
in a given perception’ and an indistinguishable hallucination (Hinton 1973:
71). The most specific common description of both states, then, is a merely
disjunctive one: the experience is either a genuine perception of a rabbit or
a mere hallucination of a rabbit. Hence the theory’s name.
The theory was first proposed by Hinton (1973) and was later developed by
P.F. Snowdon (1979), John McDowell (1982 and 1987) and M.G.F. Martin
(2002, forthcoming). It has recently been endorsed by Hilary Putnam (1999)
and Timothy Williamson (2000). In his endorsement of the theory, Putnam
argues that the distinctive feature of disjunctivism is ‘that there is nothing
literally in common’ in perception and hallucination, ‘that is, no identical
quality’ (1999: 152). This remark, however, shows a common misunder-
standing of disjunctivism. For as noted above, disjunctivists do say that
there is something literally in common between a perception of an X and a
hallucination of an X – each state is subjectively indistinguishable from a
perception of an X – and to that extent they exhibit a common ‘quality’. As
McDowell says,
»… the uncontentiously legitimate category of things that are the same across the different
cases is the category of how things seem to the subject’ (McDowell, 1987: 157).
But what the members of this category have in common is not that they are
all the same kind of experience. It is rather that to be a member of this cate-
gory, a state of mind merely has to satisfy a disjunctive condition of the
kind described in the previous paragraph.
Disjunctivists need not deny either that there is a common physical state –
for example, a brain state – shared by the perceiver and the hallucinator.
Indeed, if they accept the justification given for (3) above, they should not
deny this. What they will deny is that the state of perceiving an object is
identical with, or supervenes upon, this physical state (though they can ac-
cept a more global supervenience thesis of the mental state on the subject’s
body plus environment). This is because perceiving an object is an essen-
tially relational state, of which the object perceived is a constituent; or in
other words, the perception is constitutively dependent on the object per-
ceived. In this disjunctivism resembles the sense-datum theory, except that
the object in question is a mind-independent object rather than a mind-
dependent sense-datum. And in holding that mind-independent objects are
the only objects perceived, disjunctivism resembles the intentionalist the-
ory, except that it denies that the sort of state one is in when perceiving
could be had in the absence of such an object. Whereas the intentionalist
sees the properties presented in perceptual experience as represented, the
disjunctivist sees these properties as instantiated in perception, and as me-
rely represented in hallucination (see Martin, 2002: 392–395 for these
claims). Disjunctivists tend to argue that only by seeing properties as in-
stantiated in this way can we do justice to the sense in which perception is
the presentation as opposed to the representation of its objects (see the dis-
cussion in Searle, 1983: 45–46 and the commentary on this by McDowell,
1994).
Disjunctivism manages this compromise between sense-datum theories and
intentionalist theories, thus preserving our first two intuitive assumptions,
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by denying (4) the identity of subjective indistinguishables. Why deny (4)?
Certainly, as we noted above, a principle like (4) cannot be derived from
an uncontroversial general principle about all mental states: it is not true
that if two mental states are subjectively indistinguishable, then they are of
the most specific psychological kind. If I know two identical twins, I might,
for example, call to mind a memory image of one twin playing the piano
which might seem exactly the same to me as a memory image of the other
playing the piano. So I am unable to tell by introspection whether my
memory image is an image of one twin rather than the other. But this is
consistent with the image deriving from a genuine memory of one of the
twins playing the piano. It’s just I cannot tell merely by undergoing this ex-
perience which one it is a memory of.
But where conscious perceptual experiences are concerned, (4) might seem
to be more plausible. So is there an independently plausible reason for the
disjunctivist’s denial of (4)? Putnam argues that there is, since:
»There cannot be phenomenal states whose esse is percipi, phenomenal states that obey the
principle that if two occasions seem identical to a subject as far as their appearance is con-
cerned, then the subject is in the same phenomenal state. The difficulty is, quite simply, that
indistinguishability in appearance is not a transitive relation but being in the same state… is a
transitive relation.« (Putnam, 1999: 130)
The argument he gives for this is based on sorites reasoning. It is often
claimed that a series of colour patches 1, 2….100 might be such that adja-
cent pairs (e.g. 1 and 2) are subjectively indistinguishable in colour, but
that the first patch is subjectively distinguishable from the 100th. Hence
subjective indistinguishability is not transitive, and therefore it cannot spe-
cify a condition for the identity of mental states, since any such condition
must be transitive. (This is sometimes called the argument from the ‘phe-
nomenal sorites’: for some recent discussions see Graff, 2001; Mills, 2002.)
If Putnam were right, there would be a good reason for denying (4) that
subjective indistinguishability of experiences implies identity. But if he is
right, then the disjunctivist cannot say that there is any identical state, con-
dition or quality which encompasses perception and hallucination. This is
what Putnam claims as his conclusion, of course; but as we saw above, it is
not what disjunctivists actually say, nor what they ought to say. So given
that Putnam is wrong about this aspect of disjunctivism, he also must be
wrong about the phenomenal sorites. In other words, there must be a com-
mon ‘state’ which is defined by subjective indistinguishability. So since both
disjunctivists and intentionalists alike must accept this, they both must re-
spond to the charge that the phenomenal sorites shows that subjective in-
distinguishability is not transitive (see Graff, 2001 for an important argu-
ment that subjective indistinguishability is, contrary to widespread opinion,
transitive). Putnam’s argument is a poisoned chalice for the disjunctivist;
they should not endorse it.
There do not seem to be any uncontroversial knock-down arguments
against (4). It may be preferable, therefore, for the disjunctivist not to at-
tack (4) directly, but to embrace the rejection of (4) as a necessary conse-
quence of accepting the other assumptions. McDowell has argued that it is
only by accepting disjunctivism that we can give an adequate account of
how the mind is genuinely in touch with reality. For McDowell, an inten-
tionalist theory of perception is no better than a sense-data theory in this
respect, since both theories understand the essence of perception in terms
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of some state of mind which is not essentially world-involving. This gives
rise to the risk of losing genuine perceptual intentionality – genuine per-
ceptual content with objects – and leaving just ‘darkness within’ (see
McDowell, 1987: 250). The way to avoid this risk is to reject the idea of
experience as constituting the ‘highest common factor’ in perception and
hallucination (for a similar motivation, see McCulloch, 2003).
Taking a different approach, Martin argues that abandoning (4) is the least
revisionary position among all the possible responses to the problem of
perception, and thus follows Hinton (1973) in holding the disjunctivist po-
sition to be the default starting point for discussions of perception (Martin,
forthcoming). In other words, the disjunctivist position best accommodates
our pre-theoretical conception of perception – the conception described
above as ‘openness to the world’. This approach can concede that assump-
tion (4) also has some pre-theoretical, intuitive appeal; but it will insist that
rejecting (4) involves less of a departure from the phenomenological data
than rejecting (1) or (2).
Opponents of disjunctivism tend to put pressure on where it can seem that
the disjunctive explanation comes to an end earlier than it should. Hence
Sturgeon (1998, 2000, chapter 1) has argued that unlike other theories of
perception, disjunctivism cannot account for the apparently manifest fact
that both perception and hallucination can be (subjective) reasons for be-
liefs or actions. For example: I perceive a rabbit and gain the belief that
there is a rabbit there; this together with my other attitudes gives me a rea-
son to chase it. Sturgeon argues that the same collections of reasons could
be present in the hallucinatory case too. But how does disjunctivism ex-
plain this if it cannot appeal to a common experience which can be a reason
in both cases? Similarly, Smith (2002 chapter 8) argues that disjunctivism
fails to give an account of the object of a hallucinatory experience, and
therefore is committed to the counter-intuitive view that in hallucination
one is literally not aware of anything.
The debate about perception in analytic philosophy at the beginning of the
21st century in some ways echoes the debate of a century earlier. Russell,
Moore and their contemporaries were engaged in a debate about the ob-
jects of experience which has many elements in common with today’s de-
bate, although there are many differing elements too. They were concer-
ned about what the objects of perceptual experience were, whether the ob-
jects of experience were external to the mind, and what was present to the
mind in the case of illusion and hallucination. These questions have their
present-day counterparts posed by what has been called here the problem
of perception. However, it seems fair to say that while at the beginning of
the 20th century, the chief protagonists in the philosophy of perception
were the direct realists and the sense-data theorists, at the beginning of the
21st century they are the disjunctivists and intentionalists.
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